nature of conflict in africa

These effects will not be uniform across entire countries. It focuses on issues related to incomplete and contested data collection on this topic; the important distinction between state-based and nonstate armed conflicts; the complex array of often incoherent belligerents involved in armed conflicts in Africa; trends in governance, notably backsliding on democratic reforms; as well as more assertive peace operations deployed by the UN and regional organizations within Africa. Work in progress for Africas remaining conflict hotspots The first point is that despite some important recent advances in data collectionmost notably in generating geo-referenced dataour collective knowledge about armed conflicts in Africa still rests upon weak foundations.4 Debate continues among the leading databases over what exactly should be counted as a relevant indicator of armed conflict, including whether to include nonviolent episodes or just events that produce fatalities.5 There is also the difficult problem of how to collect accurate and comprehensive information about organized violence on the continent, much of which takes place in extremely remote locations. In addition to being cross-border by nature, transnational conflicts include a sociological framing. This strategy seems to have paid off, however. In political science especially, the development of violent organisations in border regions was understood as a result of either state failure or state policy. His movement was originally assembled in neighbouring Cte dIvoire. Dr. Paul D. Williams is an Associate Professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University, where he also serves as Associate Director of the Security Policy Studies graduate studies program. Terrorist organisations, for example, have become more international and transnational since the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) launched the first hijacking of a plane in 1968, a process that has accelerated since the end of the Soviet-Afghan War in the late 1980s. [44] Walther,O. [31] Arieli,T. (2016), Borders, conflict and security, International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. ), African Border Disorders: Addressing Transnational Extremist Organizations, Routledge, New York. This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice tothe status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. While there is no doubt that borders are critical to understanding the diffusion of violence, the dynamics and factors related to diffusion have not been fully clarified. The roots of contested government transitions lie in the deficit in democratic governance, the increasing militarization of Africa (most notable in rising defense budgets since 2002), the growth in political militias and various manifestations of presidential praetorian guard units, the suffocation of free and fair electoral processes, and the willingness of populations to participate in organized protests against their governments.18 Such transitions have taken the form of coups detat as well as other forms of armed conflict.19. [59] Ellis,S. (1998), Liberias Warlord Insurgency, James Currey, Oxford. This shift in approach is particularly well represented in the border studies literature that initially focused on the United States-Mexico border in the 1980s and has, since then, expanded to cover most regions of the world (Parker and Vaughan-Williams, 2009[38]; Pisani, Reyes and Garca, 2009[39]; Makkonen and Williams, 2016[40]). On the one hand, there is little doubt that state forces are more constrained by the existence of international boundaries than rebels and extremist organisations, for whom borders can represent an artificial line in the sand or a political manifestation of state order to be destroyed. 57/3, pp. 573-594, https://doi.org/10.3366/AFR.2010.0403. However, as shown by Nugent (2019[2]), colonial powers struggled to establish a productive social contract with borderlanders that would promote economic development across the region. The groups violent activity has declined sharply in all countries since the early 2010s, with only 46 violent events recorded in 2020, more than 10 times less than in 2002 (Figure2.1). Continuity and Change in War and Conflict in Africa The limitations of peacemaking through power-sharing have also had important consequences for the record numbers of peacekeepers deployed to Africa in recent years. While the analytic community working on these issues has improved its ability to catalogue events by engaging local reporters, field research can be difficult and dangerous, media outlets are unable to report on all relevant conflict events, nongovernmental and international organizations are not uniformly present across the continent, nor are governments there able to provide accurate data, not least because many of them lack stable and effective bureaucracies to act as repositories of such knowledge. [53] Thurston,A. If they are far apart, it means, on the contrary, that armed groups are heavily constrained by national boundaries and may develop a more national or local agenda. (2019), Re-describing transnational conflict in Africa, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on armed conflicts in Africa, with a particular focus on their spatial dimension. [14] Department of State (2019), Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, Department of State, Washington D.C. [8] Dobler,G. (2016), The green, the grey and the blue: A typology of cross-border trade in Africa, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. A distant location imposes transaction costs, such as unfamiliarity with the physical and social terrain, different languages, and an increased risk associated with operating away from home turf, where it may be less obvious who can or should be bribed. 17/4, pp. [27] Kaldor,M. (2012), New & Old Wars : Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto. PRISM. The deliberate targeting of noncombatants has raised enormous challenges for peacekeepers mandated to protect civilians and for peacemakers who have usually operated on the presumption that the conflict parties will eventually be willing to respect such international norms and legal standards. Further, borders that are aligned with certain natural features, like rivers or bodies of water, may serve to limit movement even without formal control in a way that other border contexts may not (Dobler, 2016[8]). In recent years, state forces have been known to cross into neighbouring countries to restore order at their margins, by cutting communication lines, destroying insurgent bases, or exerting their right of hot pursuit. Data about casualty figures remains particularly unreliable. Third, peace operations as currently designed have usually focused on addressing national level political dynamics and only secondarily on some local level issues. 487-504, https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCMA-08-2015-0050. Specifically, what renowned political scientist Scott Straus dubbed livelihood struggles, most of which are connected to issues of access to water and land, are likely to increase in number and intensity.26 Their intensity will probably increase as a result of the availability of cheap but deadly small arms and light weapons. (2021[65]). Militant Islamist violence in Africa is largely concentrated in five theaters, each comprising distinct, locally based actors and context-specific challenges: the Sahel, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, North Africa, and Mozambique. 119-135. ), Border Disputes: A Global Encyclopedia, ABC-CLIO/Greenwood, Santa Barbara. 66-88, https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2016.1132906. Walters study noted that by the 2000s, 90 percent of all civil wars worldwide were repeat civil wars, most of which occurred in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Specific wars are always the result of the conscious decisions of groups of humans, not the weather. More recent studies argue that these approaches are complementary. 21 World Peace Foundation, African Politics, African Peace, para.41. Started in the mid-1980s in northern Uganda as a rebellion against the government of President Yoweri Museveni, the LRAs longevity is tightly linked to the groups opportunistic and strategic use of borders and borderlands (Box2.3). 23 See the trends identified by the UCDPs One-sided Violence Dataset and ACLED, Trend 1: Rates of Violence in 2016, January 18, 2017, available at . 52/6, pp. In Southern Africa, the WebThe African environment is riddled with the past history of conflicts among groups either for an economic outlet or imperial space, and most often, such past negative interactions The state-centred approach to transnational conflicts have emphasized the importance of safe havens for anti-state armed groups and militias. These approaches suggest that states are either too weak to control their territory or too strong to tolerate terrorist organisations within their boundaries. By doing so, the report contributes to the burgeoning literature on violent actors transnationalism and adoption of safe havens in response to state power or weakness. In a literal sense, a conflict is considered transnational if it extends beyond the borders of a single state, and any form of conflict not neatly contained by a states borders could therefore be transnational by nature, including all interstate wars. Under the settlement, Burkina Faso received 786 square kilometres of territory and 4 towns while Niger received 277 square kilometres and 14 towns. WebThe author compares three such cases, in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya, arguing that they are best understood as political conflicts, driven by corrupt, undemocratic political In the Sahara-Sahel, particularly, very few Jihadist organisations have succeeded in developing a religious and political project that would transcend ethnic and national boundaries, as the examples of Ansar Dine, Katibat Macina and Boko Haram clearly show. The two objectives are contradictory by nature and, as a result, Ansar Dine has failed to recruit massively beyond its tribal base among the Ifoghas in Mali and has proven unable to unite Tuaregs from neighbouring countries. [37] Frowd,P. (2018), Security at the Borders: Transnational Practices and Technologies in West Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108556095. According to the well-known principle of communicating vessels, pressure exerted by one country on an armed group usually results in its opportunistic move to another country where military capabilities or political will are weaker. 35 See Alex de Waals discussion of peacemaking in Africas political marketplace in The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa (Cambridge: Polity, 2015). Violent Conflicts in Africa Indeed, the elements of both continuity and change currently shaping the character of armed conflict in Africa pose serious challenges to international peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives. PRISM Volume 6, No 4, Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has experienced a disproportionately large number of armed conflicts. Conceptual map including relevant SDGs. The Protests, the Drivers, the Outcomes, European Union Institute for Security Studies Brief No. 25/1, pp. 10, pp. One of the key contributions of this interdisciplinary approach has been to highlight the symbolic and identity-forming importance of international boundaries for those who live in borderlands and routinely cross borders (Scott, 2020[41]). [35] Brunet-Jailly,E. (2012), Theorizing borders: An interdisciplinary perspective. [6] Avdan,N. and C.Gelpi (2017), Do good fences make good neighbors? AU-UN IST PHOTO / STUART PRICE. First, it is important to recall that most of Africas recent state-based armed conflicts are repeat civil wars. This phrase was used by renowned political scientist Barbara Walter to describe old wars restarted by the same rebels after a period of peace.14 This repetitive trend is not confined to Africa but is clearly apparent on the continent. [45] Justin,P. and L.De Vries (2017), Governing unclear lines: Local boundaries as a (re)source of conflict in South Sudan, Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. Rebuilding social and political relations with local communities is a complicated and long-term process. [46] Moyo,I. and C.Nshimbi (eds.) [23] Salehyan,I. First, having declined considerably from the early 1990s until 2010, the number of state-based armed conflicts in Africa has recently increased. He strongly opposed AQIMs decision to go to war against the secular MNLA and encouraged them to build long-lasting alliances in Mali, with both political leaders and local communities. The final section highlights some of the more novel patterns since 2010, notably the rise in state-based armed conflicts; growing levels of popular protests; the increased significance of religious (especially Islamist) factors in state-based armed conflicts on the continent; the likelihood of more intense livelihood struggles exacerbated by environmental change, especially among some nonstate actors; and the growing use of remote forms of violence, especially IEDs and suicide bombings. When local Jihadist groups started to impose sharia and destroy local shrines, the population reacted negatively and turned its back on extremist groups. 28 Williams, War and Conflict in Africa, chapter 7. In 2010, for example, Mauritania conducted a series of raids against AQIM in northern Mali without the support of Malian forces (Harmon, 2014[51]). [63] France 24 (2020), French forces kill al Qaedas North Africa chief in Mali, defence minister says, France24, https://www.france24.com/en/20200605-french-forces-kill-al-qaeda-s-north-africa-chief-in-mali-ministry-says (accessed on 5June). [1] Howard,A. and Shain (eds.) In recent years, state-centred approaches to transnational conflicts have been replaced with other approaches that emphasise the autonomy and resilience of non-state actors. On the other hand, most Jihadist organisations still rely on tribal and ethnic support for funding, allegiance, and military operations against their common enemies. The changing nature of conflict in Africa : challenges Source: Adapted by the authors from Skillicorn et al. 5/3, pp. As informal trade expanded, state institutions proved increasingly unable to deliver public goods in exchange for taxation, and fashioned rules without implementing them. The governance of postcolonial elites, natural resources, sovereignty, ethnicity and religion are ingredients that combine in different ways and to varying degrees in each conflict rather than operating as universally deterministic causes. The location where Droukdel was killed is a remote stretch of the Malian border more than 800 miles from Bamako as the crow files. CONFLICTS With the LRA now scattered, civilians in CAR, DRC and South Sudan became victims of violence and self-organised into protective militias. [58] ACLED (2021), Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, https://acleddata.com. Heavy rains in Somalia, coupled with recent disputes between clans, has resulted in over four thousand IDPs seeking shelter at an AMISOM military base near the town of Jowhar, with more arriving daily. As a consequence, it has been relatively common to view modern Africa as lacking many interstate armed conflicts. Prominent policymakers focus their attention elsewhere, on the popular conflicts of the day. Rather, both state and non-state actors are involved in complex networks of alliances and conflict that shape the patterns of violence observed since the late 1990s (OECD/SWAC, 2021[26]) and both tend to use borders as a resource that can be mobilised to defeat their enemy. In other words, there is no such thing as a power vacuum in which violent organisations could develop without competing with alternative forms of governance (Titeca and de Herdt, 2010[33]). WebIt argues that although border-related conflicts have been displaced by governance-related intra-state contests, Africas poorly demarcated boundaries are still potent sources of inter- state conflict, particularly since porous boundaries serve as conduits by which intra-state conflicts spill over to Africas regions. (2021), The diffusion and permeability of political violence in North and West Africa. In June 2020, for example, French and American forces learned that AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel was on his way to meet Iyad Ag Ghaly, the leader of the Group for Supporting Islam and Muslims (JNIM), in northern Mali. 23/4, pp. Of course, popular protests in Africa are not new per se but their number has increased significantly since the mid-2000s and especially after 2011 following the Arab Uprising.24 These protests have emerged from various forms of grievances and frustration driven by unmet popular aspirations for change and the inability or unwillingness of many African governments to respond effectively. [62] Bs,M., A.Ciss and L.Mahamane (2020), Explaining violence in Tillabri: Insurgent appropriation of local grievances?. [34] Strazzari,F. (2015), Azawad and the rights of passage: the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group formation in northern Mali, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. This study maps the evolution of violence across North and West Africa, with a particular focus on Mali, Lake Chad and Libya. The nature of violent conflicts in Africa has changed since before independence when they were mostly ideologically-driven guerilla warfare. For example, modern wars often involve foreign-based material support for a government or an armed non-state group, operational alliances with external actors, or full-fledged foreign military interventions. 36 The authors of African Politics, African Peace claim that inclusivity is a traditional characteristic of African approaches to peacemaking, paras. Many of these groups are incoherent inasmuch as they lack a single, unified chain of command but operate instead as relatively decentralized entities with their constituent parts retaining significant autonomy. [33] Titeca,K. and T.de Herdt (2010), Regulation, cross-border trade and practical norms in West Nile, north-western Uganda, Africa, Vol. [66] Thurston,A. Boundaries and borders are politically constructed lines of division that separate two pieces of land from one another. K RUSAGARA SA ARMY SEMINAR 21 26-28 February, 2008 2 Scope A) Introduction B) The Example of Kenya C) Recent Conflicts in Africa D) Climate Change as a Source of Potential Conflict E) Conclusion 3 A) Introduction The nature of future conflict in Africa and the Thirty-five out of seventy-two On Christmas Eve 1989, Charles Taylors National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) entered Liberia to overthrow the Doe regime in Monrovia. Conflicts between states and armed groups and attacks on civilians have continued or escalated in most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. For underresourced and unprepared peacekeepers the results can be disastrous. The map suggests that the presence of a border has little influence until its potential overhead is at least equivalent to the costs of 100 kilometres of intra-country travel. Recent approaches no longer treat borders as exclusively rigid and enforced state-drawn boundary lines controlled by states and authorities. They also vary according to the institution measuring them. Sadly, the most appropriate response to this question is that it is not seen very much at all. By Paul D. Williams 27/4, pp. The Mo Ibrahim Index on African Governance (IIAG), for instance, reports a slightly increased average governance score across the continent from 200615.8 In contrast, the overall IIAG category of safety and rule of law saw a negative trend during that decade, affecting nearly two-thirds of Africas citizens. 1-17. In recent years, for example, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) has expanded its operations in the border region of Tillabri between Niger and Mali (Bs, Ciss and Mahamane, 2020[62]). [54] Walther,O. and W.Miles (eds.) The western part of the Gulf of Guinea provides a dramatic example of how wars and borders were intertwined during the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Map2.1). Far from being ungoverned, borderlands are now considered as regions where alternative forms of co-operation, exchange, and resistance compete with the more hierarchical mode of regulation of the state (Meagher, 2014[30]). 24/1, pp. Several factors explain why African borders have gradually become synonymous with political disorder. Despite being known as one of the most mobile armed groups in North Africa, more than 90% of the fatalities and violent events related to the GSPC were in Algeria between 1999 and 2006, while the proportion of domestic fatalities and events exceeds 75% for AQIM between 2007 and 2017. As weak or failed states, the absence of full state control over its own territory creates ungoverned areas or safe havens for transnational criminality and terrorism which contributes towards spreading terrorist attacks to neighbouring countries, as in Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia and Syria. [9] Radil,S., J.Pinos and T.Ptak (2021), Borders resurgent: Towards a post-Covid-19 global border regime?, Space and Polity, Vol. CONFLICT IN AFRICA The author shows how The Lebanon-Syria border, Syria-Iraq borderlands, Southern Lebanon, and Kurdistan are home to another nine such organisations, including the Islamic State, that use borderlands as resources. Non-state actors also use borderlands as a haven to recruit, train their forces, and plan their attacks without interference from their main enemies. CONFLICT IN AFRICA In a confidential letter found in Timbuktu, Droukdel warned his Saharan commanders that the great powers with hegemony over the international situation () still have many cards to play that enable them to prevent the creation of an Islamic state in Azawad ruled by the jihadis and Islamists. Peace operations since 2010 have come close to warfighting or crossed the line against particular spoiler groups in the Central African Republic (CAR), Cte dIvoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, and Somalia, as have the multinational forces deployed in Central and West Africa against the Lords Resistance Army and Boko Haram respectively. (11) However, materialism provides a strong and formidable basis for most conflicts within the Africa sub-region. The new boundary between the two countries was delineated along the course of the Niger and Mekrou rivers. WebFigure 1. 31-46, https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2017.1294497. On the one hand, a key objective of Jihadist groups is to build on a supranational community of believers to create new political entities in which the political and the religious would not be separated, as during the Islamic Golden Age which begun in the 8th century (Moghadam and Fishman, 2011[67]). [60] Silberfein,M. and A.Conteh (2016), Boundaries and conflict in the Mano River region of West Africa, Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. Source : Kill (2013[10]) and Walther (2015[11]). (2007), Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens, Praeger. [24] Iocchi,A. They also exhibited important elements of interstate contestation (noted above), where external states, particularly those from the immediate neighborhood, were directly involved politically or militarily or both. [17] Arsenault,E. and T.Bacon (2014), Disaggregating and defeating terrorist safe havens. Moving across borders and utilising borderlands has allowed the LRA to succeed continuously in this aim.

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